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Another "Straightforward Application":' The
Impact of Melendez-Diaz on Forensic Testing
and Expert Testimony in Controlled Substance
Cases
JOHN WAIT*

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, Duane Deaver, a Special Agent with the North Carolina
State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI"), performed a series of serology tests
pertaining to the murder case of State of North Carolinav. Gregory Flint
Taylor.'
Less sensitive presumptive tests confirmed the possible
presence of blood on several areas of Greg Taylor's vehicle;3 however,
more sensitive confirmatory tests were negative.' Mr. Deaver dutifully

1. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009).
* Attorney, Wait Law, P.L.L.C., High Point, North Carolina, http://www.waitlaw.com. I would like to sincerely thank the editors and staff at the Campbell Law Review
for the opportunity to write this Article and for their editorial assistance.
2. Chris Swecker & Michael Wolf, An Independent Review of the SBI Forensic
Laboratory, at 5-6 (released Aug. 18, 2010), http://ncdoj.gov/getdocl0a92ee8l-0667see
also
4935-b2d3-221d4f586c61/ndependent-Review-of-SBI-Forensic-LAB.aspx;
Transcript of Evidence at 140, State v. Taylor, Nos. 91-CRS-71728, 92-CRS-30701 (Apr.
4, 1993) (mentioning Jeff Taub, another forensic serologist, as a testing analyst in the
final report). Mr. Taub is not mentioned in connection to Greg Taylor's case in the
independent review published by Mr. Swecker and Mr. Wolf.
3. Agent Donald Pagani testified that he also performed a presumptive test in the
field (a phenolphthalein test) on the vehicle prior to collecting and sending the
remaining portion of the substances and vehicle parts to the SBI for further testing.
Transcript of Evidence at 135-36, Taylor, Nos. 91-CRS-71728, 92-CRS-30701. The
exhibits sent by Agent Pagani were later analyzed by Mr. Deaver. Id. at 140.
4. Swecker & Wolf, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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recorded the results of the tests in his lab notes. 5 When he later
prepared his final report for trial, the negative test results from the more
sensitive tests were omitted.6 Mr. Deaver did not testify at trial, and his
report was subject to cross-examination only through the testimony of
Agent Donald Pagani, an agent in the City-County Bureau of
Identification in Raleigh, North Carolina.
Greg Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder on April 4th,
1993.8 Nearly seventeen years later, on February 17th, 2010, Greg
Taylor became the first convicted defendant to be exonerated by the
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission. 9 After Mr. Deaver's
actions were brought to the attention of the North Carolina Attorney
General's Office, the Attorney General ordered an independent review,
which revealed that the SBI Forensic Laboratory may have prepared up
to 230 erroneous reports between 1987 and 2003.1' In each of the 230
cases identified by the independent review, discrepancies appeared
between the final report prepared for trial and the documented results of
the tests or testing analysts' lab notes."
The unfolding saga of the SBI, in the wake of Greg Taylor's case,
highlights the Sixth Amendment contention urged in this article: Lab

5. Id. at 6.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5-6; Transcript of Evidence at 66, Taylor, Nos. 91-CRS-71728, 92-CRS30701. The relevant excerpts of Agent Pagani's testimony in connection with the final
report prepared by Mr. Deaver appear in the trial transcript as follows:
Q. All right. As to the presence of blood in item 16, the automobile fender
liner, what did these serologists report to you?
A. Examination of item 16 gave chemical indications for the presence of blood.

Q. All right. So the, the stained thread from the A-frame didn't reveal the
presence of blood?
A. That's correct.
Q. But the stained thread from the fender edge did reveal the presence of
blood, number 18?
A. That is correct.
Id. at 145-46. According to the final report prepared by Mr. Deaver, one other sample,
taken from the victim's pants, failed to reveal the presence of blood. Id. at 147. The
examination of Agent Pagani at trial concerning the victim's pants was similar to the
above-quoted testimony. See id.
8. State v. Taylor, 447 S.E.2d 360, 362 (N.C. 1994).
9. Swecker & Wolf, supra note 2, at 5.
10. Id. at 5, 9. Mr. Taub is mentioned in connection with at least two suspected
cases in the review, not including Greg Taylor's case. Id. at 19.

11. Id.at 10-11.
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analysts conducting forensic tests on controlled substances must be
subject to confrontation as a pre-requisite to admitting their test results
12
into evidence, unless a defendant waives his right to confrontation.
The reasons for this policy will be explained at length in this Article;
however, it can poignantly be illustrated by simply pondering whether
Mr. Deaver would have more thoroughly translated his lab notes to the
final report if he knew that the entirety of his actions could be subject to
cross-examination.13 Since 1992, the prosecution has been required to
provide defense counsel with lab notes written by the testing analyst
under Brady v. Maryland." Perhaps Mr. Deaver could have simply
chosen to manipulate the lab results in other ways if he knew that he
would have to testify. However, even assuming that this alternate
scenario had occurred in the Taylor case, at least Taylor's defense
counsel would have had some opportunity to discover the errors during
trial preparation by examining the lab notes if Mr. Deaver's presence had
been required at trial - an opportunity that was not available because the
substance of the final report was allowed to come into evidence via the
testimony of Agent Pagani.
The issue of whether a testing analyst must be subject to
confrontation is currently pending review in the United States Supreme

12. After the Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz, the North Carolina
General Assembly amended several notice and demand statutes relating to forensic
reports. 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 473. In most cases, the prosecution must give a
defendant fifteen days' notice that a forensic report will be submitted in a proceeding.
See id. If a defendant does not offer a written objection, then the forensic report can be
admitted to establish its substantive allegations without the testimony of the analyst. See
id. The Supreme Court indicated in Melendez-Diaz that such waiver provisions would
pass Sixth Amendment scrutiny. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534
n.3 (2009) ("The right to confrontation may, of course, be waived, including by failure to
object to the offending evidence; and States may adopt procedural rules governing the
exercise of such objections.").
13. Interview by Raleigh News and Observer with Jeff Taub, former forensic
serologist, SBI, in Raleigh, NC (Aug. 27, 2010). Following the publication of the review,
Mr. Taub stated in an interview that the reporting methods now under investigation were
He claimed that these
misunderstood by the defense counsel in each case.
"misunderstandings" could have been avoided had he been called to testify at trial. Id.
14. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also State v. Cunningham, 423
S.E.2d 802 (N.C. App. 1992). This rule is now codified in North Carolina's General
Statutes. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2009). On defendant's motion, the State
must "[miake available to the defendant the complete files of all law enforcement and
prosecutorial agencies .... The term 'file' includes the . . . investigating officers' notes,
results of tests and examinations, or any other matter or evidence obtained during the
investigation of the offenses alleged to have been committed by the defendant." Id.
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Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.15 Specifically, the issue on review is
"[w]hether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to
introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst
through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did
not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the
statements."16 In Bullcoming, the defendant, Donald Bullcoming, sought
to exclude expert testimony at trial summarizing a report" from a gas
chromatograph showing that his blood alcohol content was above the
The Supreme Court of New
legal limit following a car accident."
Mexico concluded that the analyst transcribing the printout from the gas
chromatograph was a "mere scrivener,"" and because Bullcoming's "true
accuser"20 was the machine itself, Bullcoming's right to confrontation
was satisfied by allowing him to cross-examine an expert analyst other
than the analyst recording the machine's output. 21
This same issue as to expert testimony based on materials produced
by a non-testifying analyst is also up for review in the North Carolina
Supreme Court as a result of a series of drug cases decided by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals 22 following the United States Supreme Court
decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts in 2009. Should the North
Carolina Supreme Court grant review, the precise issue will be whether a
supervisor of a testing analyst can testify that a particular substance is, in
fact, a controlled substance, where the supervisor has conducted a "peer
review" of the final report but has not participated in the testing
process.
Presumably, the United States Supreme Court has granted review in
Bullcoming in order to further clarify its holding in Melendez-Diaz. If so,
the Court may lay the foundation necessary for state courts to be able to
identify which forensic lab analysts need to be subject to confrontation

15. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 226 P.3d I (N.M. 2010), cert. granted, No. 0910876, 2010 WL 2008002, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010).
16. Bullcoming, 2010 WL 2008002, at *1.
17. The gas chromatograph printed the results of the test, and then the printout was
transcribed by the testing analyst to the final report admitted at trial. Bullcoming, 226
P.3d at 6.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 9-10.
22. See State v. Brennan, 692 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. App. 2010), temporary stay allowed,
698 S.E.2d 72 (N.C. May 21, 2010); State v. Brewington, 693 S.E.2d 182 (N.C. App.
2010), temporary stay allowed, 698 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. Jun. 4, 2010).
23. Brewington, 693 S.E.2d at 184; Brennan, 692 S.E.2d at 428.
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and which analysts are, perhaps, "mere scriveners" under the Sixth
Amendment. The outcome in Bullcoming, however, could be far less
pragmatic. Since Melendez-Diaz, Justice Sonya Sotomayor and Justice
Elena Kagan have been appointed to the bench, and both justices have
replaced a prior justice that voted with the majority in Melendez-Diaz.
Taking into consideration each new justice's prosecutorial background,
the future of Melendez-Diaz is not clear or certain.
Assuming that the Supreme Court does provide some guidance in
Bullcoming and does not abrogate the precedent of Melendez-Diaz,24 it
will become the obligation of the collective state courts to apply
Bullcoming to determine which lab analysts must testify at trial and
which analysts, due to the nature of their duties, are not necessary
witnesses for cross-examination. Part I of this Article will analyze
Melendez-Diaz with a focus on extracting indicators within the opinion
that lend guidance as to how the opinion could be extended to
Bullcoming and to expert testimony based on forensic reports in
controlled substance cases. Part II will provide an overview of the tests
utilized by the SBI to determine the nature and quantity, if any, of
suspected controlled substances with the goal of ascertaining who, under
Melendez-Diaz, should be subject to confrontation. Part III will provide
a prediction of the outcome in Bullcoming. Finally, Part IV will review
the pending cases from the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressing
expert testimony based on non-testifying analysts' reports and will offer
an analysis showing that the expert testimony in these cases is
insufficient under the Sixth Amendment.
I.

MELENDEZ-DiAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS

In 2001, police officers outside of a Kmart in Boston,
Massachusetts, waited for their suspect, Thomas Wright, to appear at the
front store entrance.26 The manager of the Kmart had reported to the

24. The Supreme Court granted review of the same issue presented in Melendez-Diaz
in Briscoe v. Virginia. 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010). However, notwithstanding the addition of
Justice Sotomayor to the Court, Melendez-Diaz was upheld unanimously in a per curam
opinion. Id.
25. It should be noted that this article will not address other types of forensic reports
in North Carolina. The North Carolina Supreme Court has already extended MelendezDiaz to preclude the admission of expert testimony based on autopsy reports and
forensic dental reports where the testing analyst was not subject to confrontation by the
defendant. State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304-05 (N.C. 2009).
26. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152, at *1
(Mass. App. Ct. Jul. 31, 2007).
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police that Wright, a Kmart human resource employee, had been
engaging in suspicious activity. 27 The manager said that on several
occasions he had observed Wright receive external phone calls, walk to
the front door, climb into a blue Mercury Sable, leave the parking lot
with one or two other passengers in the car, and return to the store
approximately ten minutes later.28
The officers watched Wright come out through the front door of the
Kmart, and after several minutes, walk back inside.29 A blue Mercury
Sable then pulled to the front of the building, and Wright reappeared
and entered the backseat of the car." Wright was stopped by an officer
after he exited the Mercury and started to head back toward the store.
Upon being stopped, Wright informed the officer that he was carrying
four bags of cocaine in his pocket.32 After seizing the cocaine, the officer
immediately instructed other law enforcement personnel to arrest the
men in the blue Mercury Sable.33 Ellis Montero was driving and Luis
Melendez-Diaz was in the passenger seat.
Montero, Melendez-Diaz, and Wright were all placed in the
backseat of a cruiser and transported to the police station." As the men
proceeded through the booking process, an officer returned to the
parked cruiser in order to examine the backseat, because Montero and
Melendez-Diaz had been talking and moving in an animated fashion
during the ride. 6 In the backseat of the transporting cruiser, the officer
found nineteen small plastic bags of cocaine totaling 22.16 grams.
Luis Melendez-Diaz was charged and convicted of distributing and
trafficking cocaine under Massachusetts's General Statutes.3 ' At trial, his
defense counsel argued that Melendez-Diaz was denied his right under
the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. This
argument relied on the fact that several "certificates of analysis" were
admitted into evidence, certifying that the bagged white powder from

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
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the back of the cruiser was, in fact, cocaine." These "certificates of
analysis" were prepared by forensic analysts not present at trial. The
trial court disagreed with defense counsel, and when Melendez-Diaz
raised his Sixth Amendment argument again on appeal to the Appeals
Court of Massachusetts, the Court dismissed his argument in a footnote
in an unpublished decision."
The United States Supreme Court granted Melendez-Diaz's petition
for writ of certiorari,4 ' after review was denied by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts.
The issue presented to the Supreme Court
was whether the "certificates of analysis" were admissible to show that
the seized substances were, in fact, cocaine under the Sixth
Amendment.4 3 In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia offered what he
coined to be a "rather straightforward application"' of the Supreme
Court's holding in Crawford v. Washington" through the following three
step analysis: (1) Reports prepared by the forensic analysts while testing
confiscated substances were testimonial, because the reports contained
statements "for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact[;I" 4 6 (2)
Given the testimonial nature of the reports, the analysts were "witnesses"
under the Sixth Amendment;47 and (3) Because the analysts were giving
testimony and acting as witnesses through their reports, then "[a] bsent a
showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that [the
criminal defendant] had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, [the
criminal defendant] was entitled to 'be confronted with' the analysts at
trial."4
By allowing its holding in Crawford to do the heavy lifting, the
Supreme Court reached this conclusion in approximately four pages.
The Court then spent the remainder of the majority opinion addressing a
host of arguments and concerns raised by the State of Massachusetts and
the dissenting justices. In its response, the majority established the
following principles germane to the issue addressed in this Article.

39. Id.
40. Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152, at *1, *4.
41. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 552 U.S. 1256 (2008).
42. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007).
43. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
44. Id. at 2533.
45. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
46. Melendez-Dias, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71) (quotation
marks omitted).
47. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
48. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2352 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
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A. Guiding Principles in Melendez-Diaz
1. All "accusatory"witnesses must be availablefor cross-examination,
and a testing analyst is an "accusatory"witness under the Sixth
Amendment"
Since the Court had already reached the conclusion that a testing
analyst is a testimonial witness under Crawford, the Court had little
more to do than restate the plain wording of the Sixth Amendment in its
rationale: "The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right 'to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."o Because the analysts were
witnesses against the defendant, the Court reasoned that the defendant
had the right to confront the analyst. The Court explained that the Sixth
Amendment contemplates two types of witnesses in a criminal trial:
"those against the defendant and those in his favor."" To meet its
burden of proof, the Court observed that the prosecution "must produce"
Conversely, a defendant may or may not call
accusatory witnesses.
witnesses in his favor." The Court declined to follow the approach
suggested by the State of Massachusetts to recognize a third category of
witnesses comprised of persons helpful to the prosecution, but not
subject to confrontation." In rejecting several cases cited by the State of
Massachusetts, the Court stated that the State had "fail[ed] to cite a
single case in which [adverse] testimony was admitted absent a
defendant's opportunity to cross-examine.""
2.

Testing analysts are conventional witnesses of the sort at issue in
Sir Walter Raleigh's case"

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court discussed Raleigh's
case during its review of the common law evolution of confrontation in
criminal trials." Raleigh was accused of treason in 1603 after being
implicated by his alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, in a transcribed

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2533.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI).
Id. at 2534.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2534.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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pre-trial examination and in a letter.58 At trial, Raleigh demanded that
he be afforded the right to confront Cobham, because he believed that
Cobham lied to save himself." The judges denied Raleigh's request, and
Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death after a written copy of the
pre-trial examination and the letter were admitted into evidence."
The Supreme Court revisited Raleigh's case in Melendez-Diaz in
response to the dissenting justices' attempt to distinguish the role of a
testing analyst from ex parte witnesses such as Cobham.6 ' In writing for
the dissenting justices, Justice Kennedy argued that a lab analyst was not
a conventional witness because: (1) a conventional witness recalls past
events, while a testing analyst records near-contemporaneous results
from tests;6 1 (2) a testing analyst does not actually witness the crime, and
he or she has no involvement with any "human action related to it[;]" 6 3
and (3) a conventional witness responds to interrogation, whereas, a
testing analyst merely follows scientific protocol.'
The majority rejected each of these contentions by responding: (1)
the "certificates of analysis" did not contain near-contemporaneous test
results, because the certificates were prepared almost a week after the
tests were performed;65 (2) the temporal connection between the tests
and the documentation of the results was not relevant to the issue of
whether the analyst should be subject to confrontation, because even if
the final lab report was prepared contemporaneously, the analyst would
still be subject to confrontation due to the testimonial content in the
final report;6 6 (3) no legal authority supported the proposition that
conventional witnesses are only those persons who actually witness the
crime; 67 and (4) no distinction exists between those witnesses offering
evidence against a defendant during an interrogation and those offering
evidence voluntarily.68 The majority further noted that if the Sixth
Amendment applies to an affidavit prepared in response to an officer's

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
Id. at 2551.
Id. at 2552.
Id.
Id. at 2535.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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request to "write down what happened,"69 then affidavits prepared by a
testing analyst should be subject to confrontation as well."
3.

The right to confrontation is a procedural right which can be used
to expose both incompetency andfraud. As a result, there is no
meaningful distinction between testimony that recalls past events
and testimony founded on scientific testing, because both types of
evidence are subject to the same procedural guaranteeunder the
Sixth Amendment"

The majority viewed the dissenting justices' distinction between
scientific testimony and testimony recalling past events as "little more
than an invitation to return to our over-ruled decision in Roberts,n
which held that evidence with 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' was admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation
Clause."" The Court reiterated its reasoning in Crawford that the right
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment is a procedural
guarantee;74 and that the ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is not
to ensure reliability, even though reliable evidence as an end result is
certainly desirable." The majority also rejected the dissenting justices'
contention that scientific testing is neutral and reliable by noting the
following deficiencies: (1) a majority of forensic laboratories are
managed by law enforcement agencies, and an analyst under such
control may have an incentive to sacrifice protocol based on science in
favor of efficiency or expediency;76 and (2) confrontation may be able to
"weed out" an analyst committing fraud or an analyst conducting tests
The Court also noted that
without the proper training or expertise.
scientific tests on controlled substances, even if they are performed by an
honest and competent analyst, are vulnerable to a degree of subjectivity
which confrontation could be used to explore.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535.
Id. at 2536-37.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (citation omitted).
Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
Id. at 2536-37.
Id. at 2537-38.
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Sworn lab reports preparedfor trial "do not qualify as traditional
official or business records [under the federal hearsay rules], and
even if they did, their authors would be subject to confrontation
nonetheless""

Given that the "certificates of analysis" were prepared for trial, the
Court relied on its holding in Palmer v. Hoffman80 to reach its conclusion
that the certificates did not qualify as business records." In Palmer, an
accident report prepared by a railroad company was held inadmissible as
a business record because the report was prepared in anticipation of
litigation, rather than in the regular course of business."' The majority
reasoned that the certificates were more like police reports than business
records, and therefore, the certificates failed to qualify as either public
records83 or business records' under Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 5
More importantly, the Court held that if a document contains
testimonial hearsay, then its admission into evidence cannot be
supported merely by a hearsay exception in the Rules of Evidence. 6
Instead, when a document contains testimonial hearsay, its author must
be subject to confrontation.8 ' The dissent attempted to analogize the
"certificates of analysis" to a clerk's authentication of an official record at
common law, which was admissible without cross-examination." In
response, the majority observed that the clerk's ability to authenticate
was "narrowly circumscribed[;]"" and that the clerk was permitted only
"'to certify to the correctness of a copy of a record kept in his office,' but
had 'no authority to furnish, as evidence for the trial of a lawsuit, his
interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to certify to its
substance or effect."'9 O In situations where the clerk had to provide a

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2538.
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538.
Palmer,318 U.S. at 113-14.

83.
84.

FED.
FED.

R. EVID. 803(8).
R. EVID. 803(6).

85. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 2539-40.
Id.
Id. at 2538-39.
Id. at 2538.
Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 75 So. 95, 97 (La. 1917)).
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document with substantive evidence against the accused, the majority
observed that the clerk was subject to confrontation. 91
A defendant's ability to subpoena a witness is not a substitutefor
confrontation9 2

5.

In this section, the Court returned to the prosecution's burden by
rejecting a subpoena as a substitute for confrontation. The majority
noted that a subpoena is a privilege offered to the defendant, and in
situations where the witness does not appear a defendant has little
recourse.93 Because the lab analysts preparing the "certificates of
analysis" were adverse witnesses, the majority viewed the appropriate
analysis to be through the Confrontation Clause rather than the
Compulsory Process Clause."
The requirementsof the Confrontation Clause will not be relaxed
to accommodatefears that the current criminaljustice system will
not be able to adjust'

6.

The majority flatly rejected the dissent's "floodgate" argument. The
majority opinion characterized the dissent's estimation, of the number of
trials at which an analyst may have to testify, as "back-of-the-envelope
calculations."96 The majority listed ten jurisdictions that had already
adopted similar rules to those announced in Melenedez-Diaz, and
claimed that "there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has
ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another, empower a
defendant to insist upon the analyst's appearance at trial.""
B.

The rulefrom Melendez-Diaz going forward

It is apparent that the majority in Melendez-Diaz had little concern
for the practicalities of the adversarial system that initially led to the
procedure surrounding the "certificates of analysis." The Court showed
no concern for a potential overload of the system, refused to accept an
alternate mode of confrontation by rejecting a subpoena as a substitute,
and cast a wary eye toward the touted reliability of scientific analysis. As
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2539.
at 2540.

at 2540 n.10.
at 2541.
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shown by the first four pages of the opinion, the Court's position
contained no hint of nuance as it returned to the same theme
throughout its response to the State of Massachusetts and the dissent:
The Sixth Amendment requires that accusatory witnesses be subject to
confrontation, and lab analysts conducting scientific tests on controlled
substances are accusatory witnesses when they provide the prosecution
with testimonial evidence against a defendant.9"
Much has been written about Melendez-Diaz since its publication in
2009, and addressing all the concerns in response to the opinion would
require a much longer Article with a less narrow purpose. One concern
worthy of mention, however, is Justice Thomas's separate concurring
opinion. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated: "I write separately
to note that I continue to adhere to my position that 'the Confrontation
Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
This statement is
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."'"
important, because it has been cited in some jurisdictions as support to
ignore the majority's response to the dissent's argument outlined
00
supra.o
The temptation and convenience of disregarding these six principles
is certainly a juicy apple worthy of the Garden of Eden,'' however, it
remains a misguided approach. As a general rule, "[wihen a fragmented
[Supreme] Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
Moreover, "general
judgments on the narrowest grounds."""
with the
in
connection
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken
case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case,
they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a
subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision."' 3
98. Id. at 2542 ("This case involves little more than the application of our holding in
Crawford. The Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex
parte out-of-court affidavits, and the admission of such evidence against Melendez-Diaz
was error.") (footnotes and citations omitted).
99. Id. at 2543 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
100. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 4th 902 (2010); State v. Murphy, 991
A.2d 35 (Me. 2010).
101. See The Bible, Genesis, chap. 3.
102. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
103. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935) (quoting Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 290 (1821)).
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Applying these rules to Melendez-Diaz, there is little doubt that the six
principles delineated in the majority opinion are obiter dictum, and the
holding must necessarily be limited by Justice Thomas's special
concurrence.
A closer examination of the majority's dictum, however, shows that
the guidance provided therein is supported by the holding in the first
four "precedential" pages of the opinion, as limited by Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion. The first principle responded to the dissents'
argument that the testing analysts were not "accusatory" witnesses under
This argument was flatly rejected in the
the Sixth Amendment.'
precedential portion of the opinion.'0 5 The second principle countered
the dissents' contention that the analysts were not "conventional"
witnesses.106 This contention was nothing more than an attempt to
distinguish the Court's holding in Crawford, and the precedential
portion of the opinion plainly disagreed with this position as well."o'
The third principle stemmed from the supposed distinction between
evidence arising from scientific testing and testimony recalling past
events.'" The majority's response, that the right to confrontation is a
procedural guarantee, was merely a reiteration of Crawford, which was
patently applied in the precedential portion of the opinion.109 The
fourth principle reviewed the dissent's version of the hearsay rules at
common law to argue that the "certificates of analysis" could come in
The majority's response vigorously
without cross-examination.o10
disagreed with the dissent's characterization of the history of the hearsay
rules; however, more importantly, the majority noted that the
Confrontation Clause trumps the hearsay rules whenever a testimonial
statement is in issue."' At its core, therefore, the fourth principle relies
squarely on Crawford and the nature of testimonial evidence addressed
in that opinion, which was part of the precedential portion of the
opinion." 2 The fifth principle sought to shift the burden of producing
104. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533.
105. Id. at 2532 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)) ("[TIhe
analysts were 'witnesses' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.").
106. Id. at 2534.
107. Id. at 2532 ("The 'certificates' are functionally identical to live, in-court
testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination."').
108. Id. at 2536.
109. Id. at 2532.
110. Id. at 2538.
111. Id. ("But the affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records,
and even if they did, their authors would be subject to confrontation nonetheless.").
112. Id. at 2532 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 542 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
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the testing analyst to the defendant by requiring him to issue a
The majority revisited the precedential portion of the
subpoena."
opinion again by simply restating its earlier assertion that the term
"available" places the burden on the prosecution: "Absent a showing that
the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to 'be
confronted with' the analysts at trial."" Lastly, the dissent argued that
the cost, both tangible and intangible, of the majority's opinion
warranted a more relaxed analysis of the Confrontation Clause. 115
Relying on the procedural guarantee of the Confrontation Clause again,
the majority simply noted that "[il t is not clear whence we would derive
the authority to do so."" 6 Though not explicitly part of the precedential
portion of the opinion, the sentiment of the statement clearly supports
the precedential portion of the Court's analysis. "7
In short, a wholesale dismissal of the fundamental underpinnings of
the dictum portion of the majority's opinion would necessarily require a
rejection of the holding in Crawford. As a precedent, Melendez-Diaz
does not leave room for this approach, and instead it binds Crawford to
the realm of forensic affidavits and other "formalized testimonial
materials""' prepared by lab analysts for trial. The question now
becomes: How does the foundation of Melendez-Diaz impact cases
involving expert testimony such as Bulicoming and the cases available for
review in the North Carolina Supreme Court. To answer this question,
an overview of the tests and procedures used in forensic laboratories is
necessary.
II.

A.

TESTING SEIZED SUBSTANCES

North Carolina'sApproach

In Melendez-Diaz, no expert testimony was admitted at trial
concerning the nature and quantity of the seized substances in the back
of the police cruiser. As a result, the majority had no occasion to
address in its opinion whether a lab analyst's superior, after conducting a

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 2540.
Id. at 2532.
Id. at 2549.
Id. at 2540 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 2532.
Id. at 2543.
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supervisory review, could testify concerning. the contents of a final
report prepared for trial where the superior did not conduct, or assist
with, the subject tests. 119 However, the rule from Melendez-Diaz and the
issue presented in Bullcoming point to the precise constitutional question
presented when a testifying expert bases his or her testimony on a nontestifying analyst's report. The issue is whether the defendant is
confronting the witness providing testimony against him by crossexamining the testifying expert.120 If the United States and North
Carolina Supreme Courts answer the question in the affirmative, then a
defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment is
satisfied by cross-examining the supervisor, instead of the testing
analyst. If the Courts reach the contrary conclusion, then the final
report falls within the holding of Melendez-Diaz, and the testing analyst
must be available for cross-examination for the final report to be
admitted into evidence.
The first step to resolving this issue must necessarily begin with the
duties of a forensic analyst testing a seized substance. When a seized
substance is sent to the North Carolina SBI Forensic Laboratory from the
property control section of a police department, the substance is
received by an evidence technician and assigned a file number.' 2 The
evidence technician places the substance in a vault, and when the
substance is scheduled to be tested, it is pulled from the vault and
assigned to a lab analyst.122 Once the lab analyst has possession of the
substance, it remains locked in his or her laboratory until the tests are
performed on the substance. 2 3 1in
Brewington, SBI Special Agent
Kathleen Schell offered the following layman's explanation of the
119. The Supreme Court did, however, engage in a discussion of this issue at the oral
argument in Melendez-Diaz. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, 27-28, Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2008) (No. 07-591).
120. Counsel for the petitioner in Melendez-Diaz contended that a supervisor's
testimony would not violate the Confrontation Clause if the supervisor's testimony was
merely based on the raw data of the tests conducted. Id. at 28.
121. Transcript at 73-74, State v. Brennan, 692 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (No.
08-CRS-954).
Substances sent to the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
("CMPD") Crime Laboratory are sent directly to the chemistry section for initial
identification. Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. II at 250, State v. Galindo, 683 S.E.2d 785
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (No. 07-CRS-238968-69).
122. Transcript at 78, Brennan, 692 S.E.2d 427 (No. 08-CRS-954). The CMPD lab has
a similar secured holding area. Trial Transcript Vol. 11 at 120, State v. Hough, 690 S.E.2d
285 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (Nos. 08-CRS-017588, 07-CRS-216759).
123. Transcript at 76, 78, Brennan, 692 S.E.2d 427 (No. 08-CRS-954). CMPD follows
the same security procedure. Trial Transcript Vol. 11 at 121, Hough, 690 S.E.2d 285
(Nos. 08-CRS-017588, 07-CRS-216759).
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procedures and tests conducted in analyzing the suspected crack cocaine
in the case:
Q. Agent Schell, can you describe when an item comes into the
laboratory that's suspected to be, for example cocaine, can you describe
how that is tested?
A. When the items of evidence come into the lab they are assigned a
unique laboratory case number which follows that piece of evidence
throughout the entire time it's at the lab. When the time comes for an
analyst to actually analyze the piece of evidence, that evidence is in the
care and control specifically of that analyst. When the evidence becomes
available for analysis the chemist will open up the piece of evidence, take
all the packaging out of it, they will weigh that piece of evidence and
perform a series of preliminary and more specific instrumental tests in
order to come to a conclusion about the identity of that substance.

Q. Can you describe what those tests are?
A. In this case specifically?

Q.

Yes, ma'am.

A. [There] were three preliminary tests, which were inclusive of two
color tests and a crystal test, as well as a more specific instrumental test,
which identified the substance.

Q. Can you describe how the color tests are done?
A. The color tests that were used, the first one was Marquis color test,
and the color test, basically you take a little bit of the color test solution;
it's just a liquid, you put it into a spot plate well or like a little cup, and a
little piece of the sample is placed into that, and you are looking for any
type of color change or lack of color change, and based upon those
colors that either are or are not produced, it allows the chemist to focus
their direction and analysis one particular way or another.

Q. And you said there was also a crystal test?
A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Can you describe how that's done?
A. A little piece of the sample, in this case the offwhite hard material,
was placed on a slide, and then a liquid is added to that and they're
mixed together. In the case of cocaine specific cross shaped crystals will
form, and you can view those crystals using a microscope.

Q. And then there's an instrumental test?
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A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Can you describe that test?
A. During the instrumental test another piece of the sample is placed
onto an instrument, a beam of light is shown through the sample, and
based upon the amount of light that is reflected off that sample a graph is
produced and we can look at that graph and compare it to graphs of
known standards of controlled substances and make a comparison in
order to identify the substance.

A. Yes, ma'am. Can I say one thing? After that specific instrumental
test, the chemist did a method to clean up the cocaine base that was
mixed with the bicarb which took the bicarb out of the cocaine base in
order to produce a clean graph of the cocaine base."'
Once the tests are performed at the SBI, the results are recorded by the
lab analyst in a computer database, 12' and the data can no longer be
modified. 6 Information stored in the database is capable of being
viewed by other analysts.2 7 In nearly every case, the lab analyst's work
on file is reviewed by another analyst. 128 The purpose of the second
analyst's "peer review" is to determine whether "the reviewer would have
come to the same conclusions as the actual analyst" based on the raw
data recorded by the first analyst.2 If the reviewer believes that the first
analyst's results are satisfactory, then the file is approved and released. 30
Unsatisfactory files are returned to the original analyst for further
testing.'' After a testing analyst has completed his or her tests and the

124. Transcript Vol. I at 64-67, State v. Brewington, 693 S.E.2d 182 (N.C. Ct. App.
2010) (No. 08-CRS-50436).
125. Transcript Vol. II at 123-24, Hough, 690 S.E.2d 285 (Nos. 08-CRS-017588, 07CRS-216759).
126. Transcript Vol. II at 99, Brewington, 693 S.E.2d 182 (No. 08-CRS-50436).
127. Id. at 93. According to Special Agent Schell, approximately 200 people at the SBI
had access to the database file. Id. at 98.
128. Id. at 91-92. Ms. Alloway testified in Hough that approximately 99% of the lab
tests performed at the CMPD chemistry section received a "peer review." Transcript Vol.
11 at 124, Hough, 690 S.E.2d 285 (Nos. 08-CRS-017588, 07-CRS-216759).
129. Transcript Vol. II at 92, Brewington, 693 S.E.2d 182 (No. 08-CRS-50436); see
also Transcript Vol. II at 124, Hough, 690 S.E.2d 285 (Nos. 08-CRS-017588, 07-CRS216759) ("A peer review consists of looking for grammatical errors or mainly errors in
your analysis meaning [the reviewer] wouldn't come to the same conclusion that [the
testing analyst] came to.").
130. Transcript Vol. II at 92, Brewington, 693 S.E.2d 182 (No. 08-CRS-50436).
131. Id.
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results have been recorded, the testing analyst prepares a final report
describing the nature and quantity of the seized substance.132
In the arena of forensic chemistry, there exists a plethora of
preliminary and confirmatory tests available to a lab analyst to test a
suspected controlled substance. The types of tests performed vary from
case to case and jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on the technology
offered and internal lab procedures. Some preliminary tests, sometimes
called "nonspecific tests,"'33 include biological testing, 4 morphological
tests,'
color tests,'
microcrystal
tests,m
chromatography,

132. Id. at 92, 111.
133. 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 23.02, at
477 (4th ed. 2007).
134. As an example, when a laboratory rat is injected with morphine, its tail will form
an S-shaped curve. Id.
135. Marijuana is often first tested with this technique. See Transcript Vol. II at 122,
State v. Hough, 690 S.E.2d 285 (2010) (Nos. 08-CRS-017588, 07-CRS-216759);
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 133, § 23.02[a], at 479. The test requires an
analyst to look at a substance to determine whether the plant exhibits visual qualities
consistent with a banned substance. Id.
136. As explained in the testimony above from Special Agent Schell, these tests
require an analyst to apply a known reagent to a substance, observe the color change,
and classify the substance based on the color. GIANNELLI AND IMWINKELRIED, supra note
133, § 23.02[b], at 480. Color change tests come in a variety of forms and allow an
analyst to perform tests to detect codeine, cocaine, barbiturates, heroin, and morphine
among others. Id. The Marquis' reagent, used in Brewington, is a commonly used color
test. Id.
137. Microcrystal tests, also utilized in Brewington, are similar to color tests, except
that in addition to producing a color the reagent also causes a pattern to form in the
substance. Id. § 23.02[c], at 482. The pattern produced by the substance can then be
compared by the testing analyst to a known pattern of a controlled substance. Id. at
482-83. Some devices perform a microcrystal and color test simultaneously. Id. at 70
(Supp. 2009).
138. There are several different types of chromatographic techniques. See generally id.
§ 23.02[d]. Thin-layer chromatography involves placing an unknown compound on a
glass plate, placing the plate in solution, and measuring the distance the unknown
substance travels after period of time. Id. at 485-88. The distance traveled can be
compared to known controlled substances and their travel distances to determine
whether an unknown substance is a controlled substance. See id. Gas chromatography
uses the same approach, except that the substance is placed in a machine which changes
the unknown substance into a gas. Id. at 490. As the gas goes through the machine, the
machine records the retention time of different compounds. Id. at 491-92. Depending
on the location of the peaks and valleys of the printout, an analyst may be able to identify
the compound. Id. at 493. The identification under this test, however, is still
nonspecific given that several chemicals may create a peak when they are not, in fact, a
controlled substance. Id. at 494. Performance liquid chromatography creates the same
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immunoassay, 3 9 ultraviolet spectrophotometry, 1 and fluorescence
These tests are nonspecific for two reasons: (1) their
analysis. "
inability to consistently identify a specific substancel 42 and (2) their
tendency to create false positive results.14 3 Confirmatory, or "specific,"
tests include infrared spectrophotometry,'44
nuclear magnetic
resonance,' 4 5 gas chromatography/mass spectrometry,' 46 and the mixed
melting point test.
The machines running these tests produce very
few false positive results" and some can offer a readout that offers the
specific identity of the compound being tested.14 9
In Melendez-Diaz, the confirmatory test used to conclude that the
seized substances were cocaine in the "certificates of analysis" was a gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry test ("GC/MS") .1 GC/MS machines
are extremely accurate and are considered the "gold standard for forensic
testing."'5 ' The test is time-consuming and only one sample can be

sort of printout using liquid instead of gas, though the test appears to be less reliable
than gas chromatography. Id. at 496, 498.
139. This technique uses antibodies to detect the presence of drugs in urine. See id. §
23.02[e].
140. These tests measure reactions to unknown substances on the electromagnetic
spectrum. Id. § 23.02[f], at 507.
141. This procedure measures wavelengths emitted by a compound to determine
whether it is LSD. Id. § 23 .02[g], at 513.
142. Id. § 23.02, at 479.
143. See id. § 23.03, at 514.
144. Like ultraviolet spectrophotometry, this test measures wavelength and energy
after the substance is exposed to electromagnetic radiation. Id. § 23.03[a], at 515.
Unlike the UV test, it is extremely accurate. Id. at 517. After the machine creates a
graph of the substance under examination, it will search a databank to produce several
best matches to known controlled substances. Id.
145. This test is rarely used; therefore, a discussion of its scientific underpinnings is
omitted.
146. This test combines gas chromatography with a mass spectrometer. GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 133, § 23.03 [c], at 525. The gas created in the first phase is
then used in the mass spectrometer, which fragments the compound with an electron
beam and records the fragmentation pattern. Id. at 529.
147. This technique measures the melting point of the substance to determine its
composition. Id. § 23.03 [d], at 535-36.
148. Id. § 23.02, at 477.
149. 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 42:32, at 635 (2009-10 ed.).
150. Brief for the Respondent at 7, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009) (No. 07-591).
151. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 149, § 42:35, at 645.
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analyzed at a time.15 Due to the complexity of the computer equipment
and the nature of the data produced, an operator using a GC/MS
machine needs years of technical training and experience to properly use
the machine and reach a conclusion as to the substance being tested.' 53
However, even when operators do possess these qualifications, the
results can be subject to human error. 5 1
The confirmatory test used in Brewington was infrared
spectrophotometry,' 5 5 and Special Agent Schell's testimony appears to
indicate that the machine did not produce a computer readout
identifying the specific substance.156 Instead, the testing analyst, Agent
Nancy Gregory, read the graphical data from the machine and compared
it to graphs of known controlled substances.' 5 1 In Brennan, an infrared
spectrophotometer was also used for the confirmatory test.15 1 However,
unlike the machine used in Brewington by the SBI, it appears that the
infrared spectrophotometer at the CMPD's office produced a readout
identifying the tested substance as cocaine. 5
The machine used in Bullcoming was a gas chromatograph," which
is generally considered a nonspecific test.'"' Even though it is a
nonspecific test, it is widely used to analyze bodily fluids to compute
blood alcohol content.'6 2 This is due to the machine's exceptional ability
to separate components of a complex substance,16 3 making it easier for
an operator to identify ethanol from other types of alcohol potentially
present in a sample."
Notwithstanding the convenience of a gas
chromatograph, however, human error is possible both at the collection
and testing stages of the sample. 165

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 645-46.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 645.
See Transcript of Record Vol. I, Brewington, supra note 124, at 67.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
Transcript of Record, Brennan, supra note 121, at 70.
Id. at 71, 81-82.
See infra Part III.
See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 133.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 149, § 41:33, at 496.
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 133, at 494.
Id. § 20.04[c], at 246.
Id.
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Who should be subject to confrontation under Melendez-Diaz?

Why did the testing analysts need to be subject to confrontation in
Melendez-Diaz? The answer, as precedent is concerned, is simply that
the testing analysts were creating testimonial evidence by preparing the
"certificates of analysis."l66 While there was much discussion during oral
argument regarding what, exactly, the defense bar would want to ask the
analyst,' the precedential portion opinion declined to specify why the
analysts needed to be cross-examined outside of the procedural
guarantee of the Confrontation Clause." In the dictum portion of the
opinion, the majority indicated that cross-examination could be used to
explore the "analysts' honesty, proficiency, and methodology."'69 The
Court will now have to revisit this issue, because it lies at the heart of
Bullcoming, Brennan, and Brewington. If "honesty, proficiency, and
methodology" are the crucial subjects for cross-examination, only the
testing analyst will suffice. If these characteristics are secondary to a
conclusion regarding the nature and quantity of a substance, then an
expert basing their opinion on raw data will satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.
As discussed, both preliminary and confirmatory tests can be
Preliminary tests are susceptible to
tainted by human error.
misperceptions and inaccurate readings, and if performed improperly,
they can lead to inaccuracies in the confirmatory tests. Confirmatory
tests are also subject to a degree of error. Lab analysts conducting these
procedures must have years of training and experience, and in
circumstances where the machine fails to provide a definitive answer,
the analyst must take the raw data and compare it to known drugs to
conclude whether a compound is a controlled substance. However, even
if the machine does not specify the presence of a particular controlled
substance, the analyst must have the training and experience to work the
machine properly.
The methodology and sequence of the techniques described by
Special Agent Schell in Brewington surpassed most recommended
industry standards.o Yet, no matter how many tests are performed and
166. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
167. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, Melendez-Diaz, supra note 119.
168. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
169. Id. at 2538.
170. See THE SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SEIZED DRUGS,
at
available
ed.
2010),
15-16
(5th
at
Recommendations,
http://www.swgdrug.org/Documents/SWGDRUG%20Recommendations%20%205th%20edition.pdf.
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regardless of how precisely tuned a machine is, a correct result in a
forensic analysis depends on the competency of the analyst using the
machine."' The goal of a competent analyst is to eliminate the
"uncertainty"" 2 inherent during every stage of the testing process. 7 3
Thus, the more competent the analyst, the better the analyst will be at
finding results with certainty.
If this is the testing analyst's role, however, then what is achieved
by examining a supervisor or peer conducting a "peer review?" In the
SBI, by the time that the "peer review" is conducted, all the "uncertainty"
during the testing process has presumably been removed. Assume Agent
Pagani had been Mr. Deaver's reviewer in the Taylor case. If Agent
Pagani conducted his review merely by examining documents stored on
a computer database, how would Agent Pagini have known that Mr.
Deaver had truly eliminated all "uncertainty" during the testing process?
Mr. Deaver omitted negative test results from his final report. Had Mr.
Deaver intended to hide these results, how could Agent Pagani have
discovered it? Undoubtedly, the "peer review" is also part of the process
of removing uncertainty;" however, as the Taylor case shows, such
reviews are limited in their ability to detect some types of omissions.
These questions are more than just concerns with the deficiencies
inherent in the "peer reviews" and testimony given by experts based on
data compiled by a testing analyst. Instead, under Melendez-Diaz, it
points to an important moment with respect to the constitutional issue
presented. The moment the testing analyst takes a sample, places it into
the machine, and begins to generate results, the testing analyst is
producing testimonial hearsay. As the Supreme Court held in Crawford,
including Justice Thomas, testimonial statements include "pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially."' The machine prints the result or raw data, but when
the testing analyst submits that result or raw data to a database knowing
it will eventually go to the prosecution, the testing analyst is giving
testimony that he or she competently and honestly performed the test
171. Id. at 15.
172. Id. at 34. In the forensic analysis context, "uncertainty" does not encompass the
notion of doubt. Id. Instead, "uncertainty" refers to the limitations inherent in testing
and the conclusions reached; and the science of forensic analysis seeks to eliminate this
"uncertainty" through rigorous training, extensive procedures, and documentation. Id.
Nevertheless, as discussed, the testing process is fraught with opportunities for human
error.
173. Id. at 34-35.
174. Id. at 23.
175. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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producing the result or raw data. Under Melendez-Diaz, therefore, the
testing analyst must always be subject to confrontation in order for test
results to be submitted in controlled substance cases, because the data
produced by a machine becomes testimonial hearsay from the analyst.
It follows under this view that the testimony of a non-testing expert
can never suffice in and of itself. There may be situations where both
the testing analyst's documents and the testifying expert's testimony are
both testimonial and therefore subject to Crawford. In these situations,
the testing analyst would submit materials showing that he or she
performed tests on a particular sample, which produced raw data; and
the testifying expert could use that raw data to form his or her own
opinion as to whether the tested substance is a controlled substance.
Each could testify at trial as to his or her portion of the testimonial
evidence presented. Yet, even in these circumstances, the prosecution
would have to offer the testing analyst to confirm that the raw data was,
indeed, procured from: (1) the actual sample at issue in the case; (2) by
a method of testing in accordance with industry standards; and (3)
performed with an acceptable degree of competence. This would have to
be established prior to another expert, other than the testing analyst,
using the raw data to give testimony concerning the nature of a seized
substance.
As will be discussed more fully below, this position has forcefully
been rejected in at least some jurisdictions." 6 Yet, it represents what
another "straightforward application" of Crawford would entail in
situations where either the raw data or substantive conclusion of a
forensic report is admitted into evidence through the testimony of an
expert other than the testing analyst. Moreover, it is the only policy
capable of presenting defense counsel with the ability to catch
discrepancies in the testing process such as those committed by Mr.
Deaver in Greg Taylor's case. Viewing Bullcoming, Brennan, and
Brewington through this lens, the outcomes of the cases are illuminated
quite clearly.

176. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2856 (2009); see also United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008)
(following Washington); United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2008)
(following Washington); United States v. Anderson, No. 2009-06, 2009 CCA LEXIS 438
(A.F.C.C.A. 2009) (following Washington), cert. granted, No. 10-6004/AF, 2010 CAAF
LEXIS 757 (C.A.A.F. June 1, 2010).
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III. THE OUTCOME IN BULLCOMING

In its discussion of Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico concluded that Bullcoming's toxicology report was testimonial1 7 7
and then it wrote the following:
[T]he Confrontation Clause permits the admission of testimonial
statements so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain
it. Although the analyst who prepared Exhibit 1 was not present at trial,
the evidence revealed that he simply transcribed the results generated by
the gas chromatograph machine. He was not required to interpret the
results, exercise independent judgment, or employ any particular
methodology in transcribing the results from the gas chromatograph
machine to the laboratory report. Thus, the analyst who prepared
Exhibit I was a mere scrivener, and Defendant's true accuser was the gas
chromatograph machine which detected the presence of alcohol in
Defendant's blood, assessed Defendant's BAC, and generated a computer
print-out listing its results. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that the live, in-court testimony of a separate qualified analyst is
sufficient to fulfill a defendant's right to confrontation.' 78
It is likely that the toxicology report in Bulicoming will be viewed as
testimonial.' 7 9 As Justice Thomas explained in White,"so approved in
Crawford,' and concurred separately in Melendez-Diaz,'82 "formalized
testimonial materials" include statements "that are 'sufficiently formal to
resemble the Marian examinations' because they were Mirandized or
custodial or 'accompanied by [a] similar indicia of formality.""83 The
procedure of submitting Bullcoming's blood for a toxicology test in
anticipation of prosecution will probably place the document within the
sort of materials under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz that are testimonial
in nature, especially given its purpose to prove the element of a crime.
Moreover, in light of the discussion above, exhibit 1 is testimonial due to
the actions of the testing analyst.

177. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted, No. 0910876, 2010 WL 2008002, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010).
178. Id. at *8-9 (citations and quotations omitted).
179. See Grant v. Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 84 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
certificate of blood alcohol content to be testimonial).
180. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992).
181. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
182. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009).
183. Id. (quoting Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008)); see also Crawford, 541
U.S. at 36 (holding that a recorded unsworn statement to police was testimonial).
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Thus, the first issue the Supreme Court should address in
Bullcoming is whether exhibit 1 is testimonial hearsay. In the Bullcoming
opinion, no obvious mention is made of hearsay in the Confrontation
Clause analysis, even though the court's conclusion that the analyst was
a "mere scrivener" alludes to such a conclusion."' Instead, the only
mention of hearsay occurs after the above-quoted passage, where the
court concluded that the toxicology report was admissible under Rule
11-703 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, because the report
"contain[ed] facts or data of the type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field and its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect."18 5 The Court's assumption that the toxicology report is hearsay,
however, is likely correct,"' both under the reasoning of Part II of this
Article and under Melendez-Diaz.
The protection of the Confrontation Clause, under Crawford, is
implicated only when hearsay is admitted into evidence.187 In the wake
of Melendez-Diaz, several jurisdictions have adopted the position that a
184. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 226 P.3d 1, 9-10 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted, No.
09-10876, 2010 WL 2008002, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010). It should be noted
nevertheless that Washington and Moon both held that the machine printouts were not
hearsay. These cases are cited in support of the court's conclusion that the machine was
the real "accuser." Id. at 9. Washington further held that the machine did not produce a
"statement." United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009).
185. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 10.
186. Despite the Court's citation of Washington and Moon, it does not appear that the
Court held that the machine printout was non-hearsay. Had the Court reached such a
conclusion, the toxicology report would presumably have been admissible under Rules
11-801 and 11-802 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, rather than Rule 11-703. See
N.M. R. Evm. 11-801, -802, -703. The Court stated that "had Razatos not been present to
testify, Exhibit I would not have been admissible because Defendant would not have had
the opportunity to meaningfully cross-examine a qualified witness regarding the
substance of the exhibit." Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 10. This statement appears to indicate
that despite the use of Washington and Moon as support, the Court was not adopting the
same rationale as provided in those cases, and therefore it considered the report
testimonial hearsay.
187. See Davis v. Washignton, 547 U.S. 821 (2006) ("It is the testimonial character of
the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional
limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.");
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 ("The [Confrontation] Clause does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58, (1970); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-44 (1895); see also State v. Aubid, 591 N.W.2d 472, 478 (Minn. 1999)
("When hearsay is admitted in a criminal trial, it implicates the Sixth Amendment
because the accused does not have an opportunity to cross-examine the person who
made the statement.").

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss1/1

26

Wait: Another "Straightforward Application": The Impact of Melendez-Dia

2010]

THE IMPACT OF MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS

27

machine generating a printed result of a toxicology test is not a
"declarant"; and as a result, the printout itself has not been classified as a
"statement" for hearsay purposes.1' This argument that the machine was
the "witness" offering the "statement" was raised in Melendez-Diaz.'"
Interestingly, however, it was not mentioned by either the majority or
the dissent in the opinion.'90 This omission is likely due to the fact that
the "certificates of analysis" were actually signed by the analysts
conducting the tests and concluding that the seized substances were
cocaine.19 '
The distinction from these holdings made in Bulicoming is the
nature of exhibit 1. In Washington, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
based part of its conclusion on the fact that the machine created a
printout of raw data which was then interpreted at trial by the testifying
expert.'92 As a result, the Washington court held that the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the raw data being used by the expert to give
testimony concerning the occurrence of PCP and alcohol in the
defendant's blood.193 In Bullcoming, the court described the toxicology
report at issue as follows:
The report is a two-page document and was admitted into evidence as
Exhibit 1. It is attached to this opinion for reference. The first page is
composed of Part A and Part B. Part A contains chain of custody
information, specifically identifying the arresting officer, the donor, the
person who drew the donor's blood, and the date, time, and place of the
blood draw. Part A also specifies the information sought by the officer
and the location where the results are to be sent.
Part B has four parts that primarily provide chain of custody
information. The receiving employee signs the first section of Part B,

certifying the type of specimen that was received, how it was received,

whether the seal was intact, and that the employee complied with the

188. Washington, 498 F.3d at 231; see also United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th
Cir. 2008) (following Washington); United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir.
2008) (following Washington); United States v. Anderson, No. 2009-06, 2009 CCA
LEXIS 438 (A.F.C.C.A. 2009) (following Washington), cert. granted, No. 10-6004/AF,
2010 CAAF LEXIS 757 (C.A.A.F. June 1, 2010).
189. Transcript at Oral Argument at 50, Melendez-Diaz, supra note 119.
190. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
191. Id. at 2531.
192. Washington, 498 F.3d at 230 ("[Tlhere would be no value in cross-examining the
lab technicians on their out-of-court statements about whether the blood sample tested
positive for PCP and alcohol because they made no such statements. They would only
be able to refer to the machine's printouts . . .
193. Id. at 232.
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procedures delineated in paragraph two of the second page of Exhibit 1.
The analyst signs the second section of Part B, certifying that the seal of
the sample was received intact and was broken in the laboratory, that the
analyst followed the procedures in paragraph number three on the
second page of Exhibit 1, and that the test results were recorded by the

analyst. A reviewer signs the third section of Part B, certifying that the
analyst and the analyst's supervisor are qualified to conduct the analysis
and that the established procedures had been followed. Finally, a
laboratory employee signs the fourth section of Part B, certifying that a
legible copy of the report had been mailed to the donor. Finally, the
second page of Exhibit 1 identifies the method used for testing the blood
sample and details the procedures that must be followed by laboratory
personnel."'
The simple transcription by the analyst from the machine
printout"' to Exhibit 1 transformed Exhibit 1 into hearsay. 19 Prior to
this act by the testing analyst, the document addressed only chain of
custody concerns. Once the document contained a statement as to how
much alcohol was in Bullcoming's blood, the document became
testimonial hearsay when it appeared at trial as evidence of Bullcoming's
guilt. Furthermore, even if Exhibit 1 had only contained a printout of
the raw data from the gas chromatograph, the document would have
constituted testimonial hearsay that the raw data in the document
pertained to the sample of blood actually belonging to Bullcoming.
This conclusion leads to the second issue that should be addressed
by the Court: whether admission of Exhibit I was prejudicial under the
Confrontation Clause, because Bullcoming was allowed an opportunity
to cross-examine an expert regarding the document. If the Court
follows Melendez-Diaz, I believe it will conclude that Bullcoming's crossexamination of the expert was not sufficient. In summarizing the
expert's testimony at trial, the Supreme Court of New Mexico wrote the
following:
194. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 226 P.3d 1, 5-6 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted, No. 0910876, 2010 WL 2008002, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010) (emphasis added).
195. Even though the analyst transcribed the machine's result to another piece of
paper, it appears that the gas chromatograph in Bullcoming created a printout similar to
those addressed in Washington and Moon. Id. at 6. It is not clear from the opinion
whether the machine printout was admitted into evidence or mailed to Bullcoming
following the test.
196. The Court of Appeals in Virginia has reached a similar conclusion. See Grant v.
Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 84, 92 (Va. App. 2009). The Grant court observed that
Virginia's statutes require that a toxicology analyst must "attest" as to the contents of the
certificate showing a defendant's blood alcohol content. Id. at 88. As a result, the court
held that the lab analyst was a witness under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 89.
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[The expert, Gerasimos Razatos,] testified that the instrument used to
analyze Defendant's blood was a gas chromatograph machine. The
detectors within the gas chromatograph machine detect the compounds
and the computer prints out the results. When Razatos was asked by the
prosecutor whether "any human being could look and write and just
record the result," he answered, "Correct." On cross-examination he also
testified that this particular machine prints out the result and then it is
transcribed to Exhibit 1. Both the nurse who drew the blood and the
officer who observed the blood draw and who also prepared and sent the
blood kit to SLD, testified at trial and were available for crossexamination. 197
As evidenced by the above summary, Razatos merely acted as a
subterfuge for the underlying report that was prepared by the testing
analyst. Bullcoming's cross-examination did not allow him the ability to
confront the witness against him - the person accusing him of having an
illegal amount of alcohol in his blood. Bullcoming had no ability to
examine the accuracy of the transcription from the machine's printout to
Exhibit 1, a critical moment in the case given that the testing analyst was
not available at trial due to the fact that the testing analyst "was very
recently put on unpaid leave.""' Bullcoming had no opportunity to ask
the testing analyst about his competence or training or honesty. Razatos
had no empirical knowledge as to whether the gas chromatograph, a
machine requiring training and experience to use, was operated properly
or in accordance with industry standards. In short, the examination of
Razatos was simply not confrontation, because Razatos offered nothing
independent of the information in Exhibit 1 to confront. Though
Razatos offered testimony about what procedures normally occur,"' he
had no actual knowledge of the procedures actually performed in
Bullcoming's case.
The primal force behind Melendez-Diaz is the simple language of
the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him."2 "
In this case, as in Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming was not given the
opportunity to confront the witness against him - the person offering
data or results from the gas chromatograph finding too much alcohol in
his blood. As discussed in Part 11,201 only the testing analyst could have
197.
10876,
198.
199.
200.
201.

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 226 P.3d 1, 6 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted, No. 092010 WL 2008002, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010).
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
See supra Part II.
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confirmed that the gas chromatograph produced this conclusion as a
result of a properly conducted test on Bullcoming's blood.
IV. APPLYING MELENDEZ-DIAZ TO EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
NORTH CAROLINA

A. Overview
Following Melendez-Diaz, the first case in North Carolina to address
whether an expert could testify by using a report prepared by a nontestifying analyst was State v. Galindo in October 2009.202 In Galindo, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that "expert testimony based
'solely' on the absent analyst's lab report ... is indistinguishable from the
opinion testimony held to be unconstitutional" 2 03 in State v. Locklear.204
In the opinion, the Galindo court did not quote the testimony held to be
unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause; however, the trial
transcript provides the following testimony from the testifying expert,
Michael Aldridge:
Q. Did you review the work of Ms. Johnson in this case?
A. I did.
Q. When did you review it?
A. I reviewed it before I came to court today.
Q. What did that review entail?
MR. WILLIAMS: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Worksheets that she made at the time she did the
analysis, outlined the tests that she conducted. Also reviewed
chromatograms and charts that were produced by the equipment she
used to perform the analysis.
Q. Is it your opinion that the analysis under Control Number 29785
was consistent with your standard operating procedure?
A. Yes.
202. State v. Galindo, 683 S.E.2d 785 (N.C. App. 2009).
203. Id.at 788.
204. State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 2009).
description of the holding in Locklear.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss1/1

See supra note 26 for a short

30

Wait: Another "Straightforward Application": The Impact of Melendez-Dia

2010]

THE IMPACT OF MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS

31

Q. Do you have an opinion as to the identity of the substance on
Control Number 29785?
A. I do.

Q. What is that opinion?
A. My opinion, based on the work done by Mrs. Johnson, is that the
substance that she analyzed are outlined in the report that she gave.
They are cocaine of various weights.205
During voir dire, Mr. Aldridge explained in more detail what the review
he conducted involved:
Q. What did your review entail?
A. Looking at her worksheet, examining the types of tests that she
conducted, looking at the recording of the results that each test gave,
AND determining whether I would have reached the same conclusions
that she DID, based on the test results for court.

Q. Is it your opinion that the analysis under Control Number 29785 is
consistent with the standard operating procedure?
A. It is my opinion that it is.

Q. Is it your opinion that the analysis done is sufficient to identify
cocaine for the items on Control Number 29785?
A. It is consistent and it is correct.

Q. Were the results consistent with the presence of cocaine?
A. Yes.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to the identity of the substance analyzed
under Control Number 29785?
A. I do.

Q. What is that opinion?
A. It's my opinion that multiple items of cocaine were identified.206
In November 2009, State v. Mobley 207 was decided. In Mobley, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that expert testimony provided by

205. Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 11 at 255-56, Galindo,supra note 121.
206. Id. at 262-63.
207. State v. Mobley, 684 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. App. 2009), cert denied, 692 S.E.2d 393
(N.C. 2010).
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a DNA analyst at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 20 s The
testifying expert, Aby Moeykens, conducted a review of another analyst's
work.0 In conducting her "technical review," Ms. Moeykens provided
the following testimony:
Q. Did you make a technical review of [John Donahue's comparison
between the profile in the buccal swab related to Maurice Mobley and
the profile obtained from the vaginal swab]?
A. Yes; I looked both at the original data from Kelly Smith [who
performed the vaginal swab] and also the data from the buccal swab run
byJohn Donahue.
Q. Based upon your technical review what did you find?
A. The profile obtained from the sperm cell fraction of the vaginal swab
from [the victim] matches the profile obtained from the buccal swab of
Maurice Mobley.210
Based on this testimony, the Mobley court stated that Ms. Moeykens
"testified not just to the results of other experts' tests, but to her own
technical review of these tests, her own expert opinion of the accuracy of
the non-testifying experts' tests, and her own expert opinion based on a
comparison of the original data.""
In March 2010, the North Carolina Court of Appeals returned to
this issue in the controlled substance context in State v. Hough.2 12 in
Hough, the court held that expert testimony based on a non-testifying
analyst's report did not violate the Confrontation Clause under
Melendez-Diaz, as long as the expert offered their "own" expert
opinion."' The court observed that the testifying analyst, Kamika
Alloway, conducted a "peer review" of the testing analyst's report,214 and
in holding that Ms. Alloway's testimony was admissible, the court stated:
Alloway then described the specific tests that were run in this case,
which resulted in a conclusion that the two substances recovered from
the crime scene were marijuana and cocaine. She also testified as to the
weights of the drugs seized and explained that the drugs weighed less in
the laboratory than at the crime scene because the substances were
weighed without packaging in the lab. Alloway was asked: "Based on

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Mobley, 684 S.E.2d at 512.
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
State v. Hough, 690 S.E.2d 285 (N.C. App. 2010).
Id.at 290-91.
Id.
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your experience and review of these test results is it your opinion that
the results are correct as published in those two reports?" Alloway
responded: "Yes." Alloway did not merely present the test results, or read
verbatim from Aldridge's report; rather, she provided her own analysis
and expert opinion regarding the accuracy of the reports based on her
peer review.2 15
Even though there was no apparent distinction between the court's
description of Ms. Alloway's testimony and Mr. Aldridge's testimony, the
court held that Galindo was distinguishable.
6
The court addressed "peer reviews" again in May 2010 in Brennan.2
Like the expert testifying in Washington, the testifying expert, Agent
Misty Icard, claimed to reach her own conclusion 2 17 that the seized
substances were controlled substances through her "peer review":

Q. You didn't watch Ms. Knott do any of these tests?
A. No, that's not what reviewing a case is about. Reviewing a case is to
take their data, their notes and to look at it and say yes I agree with their
conclusion.

Q. Did you ever have a chance before today to examine this material
that you've got in front of you? I'm talking about the substance itself?
A. No.

Q. So this is the first time you've seen this?
A. Yes.

Q. And you're testifying today that your opinion is that it's a Schedule 2
Controlled Substance?
A. Yes, from reviewing her data I can say that that is a controlled
substance-Schedule 2 Controlled Substance, cocaine base.

Q. But you're relying on someone else's data to make that opinion,
aren't you?
A. I'm relying on data that was generated from this case.

Q. But you didn't generate that data yourself, did you?
A. No.

215. Id. at 290-91.
216. State v. Brennan, 692 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. App. 2010), temporary stay allowed, 698
S.E.2d 72 (N.C. May 21, 2010).
217. Id. at 429.
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Q.

And you're relying on someone else's data to form that opinion,
correct?
A. Correct.21 8

The Brennan court did not cite or distinguish Hough."' Instead,
after reviewing Agent Icard's testimony, the Brennan court simply stated,
"It is obvious from the above-excerpted testimony that Agent Icard was
merely reporting the results of other experts."220
The decision in Brewington was published two weeks after Brennan.
In this decision, the court quoted the testimony of Special Agent Schell
who offered a similar "independent opinion" based on her "peer review"
of the case file in the SBI's database:

Q. Now have you reviewed the testing procedures that you've described
and the results of the examinations of the test yourself?
A. I have.

Q. And have you also reviewed Agent Gregory's conclusion?
A. I have.

Q. Have you formed an opinion as to the item that was submitted inside
the plastic bag that's been marked as State's Exhibit IB?
A. I have.

Q. And what is your opinion based on?
A. Based upon all the data that she [Agent Gregory] obtained from the
analysis of that particular item, State's Exhibit IB, I would have come to
the same conclusion that she did.

Q. And what is your opinion as to the identity of the substance that was
submitted as State's Exhibit 1B?

MR. GURLEY: Just objection for the record, Judge.
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. You can answer the
question.

A. State's Exhibit IB is the Schedule II controlled substance cocaine
base. It had a weight of 0.1 gram.22'

218. Id. at 430-31.
219. Hough, 690 S.E.2d 285.
220. Brennan, 692 S.E.2d at 431.
221. State v. Brewington, 693 S.E.2d 182, 185 (N.C. App. 2010), temporary stay
allowed, 698 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. Jun. 4, 2010).
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In concluding that Special Agent Schell's testimony did not satisfy
Brewington's right to confrontation under Melendez-Diaz, the court
followed the lead of the Brennan court and added:
It is clear from the testimony of Special Agent Schell that she had no part
in conducting any testing of the substance, nor did she conduct any
independent analysis of the substance. She merely reviewed the reported
findings of Agent Gregory, and testified that if Agent Gregory followed
procedures, and if Agent Gregory did not make any mistakes, and if
Agent Gregory did not deliberately falsify or alter the findings, then
Special Agent Schell "would have come to the same conclusion that she
did." As the Supreme Court clearly established in Melendez-Diaz, it is
precisely these "ifs" that need to be explored upon cross-examination to
test the reliability of the evidence. Special Agent Schell could not have
answered these questions because she conducted no independent
analysis. She testified exclusively as to the tests that Agent Gregory
claimed to have performed, and used testimonial documents not
admissible under Melendez-Diaz. Her conclusion that she agreed with
Agent Gregory's analysis assumes that Agent Gregory conducted the
tests in the same manner that Special Agent Schell would have; however,
the record shows that Special Agent Schell had no such actual
knowledge of Agent Gregory's actions during the testing process. 222
The Brewington court distinguished Hough, writing that the
testimony of Special Agent Schell tended to bring the case within the

holding of Brennan instead of Hough.2 23 The Brewington Court did not
explain exactly how Special Agent Schell's expert opinion resembled
Agent Icard's inadmissible testimony, rather than Ms. Alloway's
admissible testimony. The court in Brewington instead simply wrote:
We believe that the Hough Court correctly stated that not "every 'peer
review' will suffice to establish that the testifying expert is testifying to
his or her expert opinion[.1" Though the Hough Court did not further
explain under what circumstances a "peer review" would skirt the edges
of a constitutional violation and thus avoid the mandate of MelendezDiaz, we believe that this case presents such a situation.224

B.

Analysis

The "peer reviews" at issue in each case are identical. As explained
in Part II, the "peer review" process is part of the protocol at the SBI and
CMPD forensic laboratories, and most files at each lab are reviewed by

222. Id. at 190.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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another analyst to see whether the reviewer would have come to the
same conclusion as the testing analyst based on observations from the
The divergence in the holdings,
underlying data and reports."2
therefore, arises not from the "peer review" procedure itself, but from
differing opinions among the panels as to what must be the subject of
confrontation. The court in Hough considered the testifying expert's
presence to be sufficient, because the defendant had the ability to
examine the expert about the routine procedures performed and the
expert's opinion as to the nature and quantity of the seized substance
based on the report and test results of the testing analyst.226 By contrast,
the courts in Brennan and Brewington believed that the experts'
testimonies were insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause because
the panels believed that the testifying experts could do no more than
make assumptions regarding what actually happened as the seized
substances were tested. 227 As a result, the defendants in those cases were
not given the opportunity to confront the witness against them, given
that the testifying experts had no actual knowledge regarding what
happened in the testing process.
Clearly the result reached in Brennan and Brewington is the result
advocated by the reasoning in this Article. 228 The courts in these cases
rightly concluded that the Confrontation Clause is not satisfied by
allowing a defendant to confront someone making assumptions about an
element of a crime - whether tests on a seized substance demonstrate
that the substance is banned by law. Though not explicit in the
opinions, the courts were considering situations such as the one
presented in Taylor, because the testimony quoted in each case shows
that the courts were skeptical that the reviewing analyst could know
from a cold record whether a test was tainted by fraud or incompetence.

225. Trial Transcript Vol. II at 91-92, Brewington, 693 S.E.2d 182 (No. COA-09-956);
see also Trial Transcript Vol. II, Hough, supra note 122, at 124.
226. See Hough, 690 S.E.2d at 290-92 ("In sum, we hold that defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated since Alloway's
testimony was based on her own expert opinion, even though she did not conduct the
original testing of the substances."); see also State v. Mobley, 684 S.E.2d 508, 512 (N.C.
2009) ("By contrast, in this case, the underlying report, which would be testimonial on
its own, is used as a basis for the opinion of an expert who independently reviewed and
confirmed the results, and is therefore not offered for the proof of the matter asserted
under North Carolina case law. Therefore, we hold Ms. Moeykens's testimony does not
violate the Confrontation Clause even in light of Melendez-Diaz.").
227. See State v. Brennan, 692 S.E.2d 427, 431 (N.C. 2010), temporary stay allowed,
698 S.E.2d 72 (N.C. May 21, 2010); see also Brewington, 693 S.E.2d at 190.
228. See supra Part II.
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Implicit in this type of reasoning is the conclusion reached in Part II of
this article: Data produced by a machine and offered by a testing analyst
as proof that a test was performed is testimonial hearsay. 229 Because the
courts in Brennan and Brewington recognized this principle and correctly
held that the testimony of the expert at trial was inadmissible under
Melendez-Diaz, the dispositions in both cases should be upheld by the
North Carolina Supreme Court.23 0
V.

CONCLUSION

The immediate fallout from Melendez-Diaz burdened prosecutors
across the country with scheduling conflicts. With analysts moving to
different states, going on maternity leave, becoming sick, or going to
court to testify, the obligation to schedule the testing analyst became
instantly overwhelming.23 ' These conflicts naturally led to increased
costs in prosecuting drug-related cases in many states.m
State
legislators and prosecutors scrambled in response to find logistical
solutions to the seemingly never-ending requests of defendants to
confront the testing analyst - including notice and demand statutes 33
and video-conferencing.234
The United States Supreme Court showed little emotion over these
practicalities in Melendez-Diaz, and rightly so. Constitutional guarantees
rarely, if ever, result in convenience when implemented. If police
officers could search everyone without cause, a lot more crime could be

229. Id.
230. See Brennan, 692 S.E.2d at 431; Brewington, 693 S.E.2d at 190. Neither Galindo
nor Hough were appealed by the defendants to the North Carolina Supreme Court, so
they are not available for review. It follows based on this conclusion that the holdings in
these cases should be disapproved. it is admitted that the rationale offered in this Article
also calls into question the holding of Mobley given that the testifying expert based her
conclusion on a "peer review" as well. Since that case involved DNA, instead of
controlled substances, however, no opinion is offered as to whether this holding should
be upheld.
231. See Brief of the States of Indiana et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
2-5, 24, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191). Between July 2008
and July 2009, the State of Massachusetts claimed that the average amount of time
needed to receive the results of a forensic drug test from the laboratory doubled from 83
days to 169 days due to trial scheduling. Id. at 7-8.
232. According to their brief, amici claimed to have collectively spent $4.5 billion
prosecuting drug-related cases in 2005 alone. Id. at 6.
233. See, e.g., discussion, supra note 12; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51
(2009); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 38.41 (2009).
234. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (No. 07-11191).
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discovered. If defendants were not guaranteed counsel, prosecutions
around the country could achieve more convictions. If juries were no
longer required, the State could save money and more people could
watch TV at home.
Following Melendez-Diaz, few commentators have had the audacity
to outright state that the precedent is too hard to put into practice.
Indeed, as the above hypotheticals indicate, such a claim would be silly.
Instead, this attitude has taken other forms. "The machines provide the
statement, so there is no witness" - as if the sample placed itself into the
machine without the assistance of a highly skilled and trained individual
running the equipment. "The testifying expert reviewed the data and
results, and he or she came to their own conclusion" - as if the testifying
expert was not relying on the assertions made by the testing analyst to
reach their opinion. "The defendant can call the testing analyst by
subpoena if he really wants [to] cross-examine him or her" - as if it is
the defendant's burden to call someone whose role is to establish an
element of the crime alleged.
These claims are merely excuses and justifications to maintain the
status quo, and they should be treated as such. Despite all claims to the
contrary, the issue presented in Bullcoming, Brennan, and Brewington is
just as "straightforward" as the issue presented in Melendez-Diaz."'
While this application of Crawford is not easy, it is nevertheless crucial
to the integrity of our judicial system as the advancement of technology
continues to improve our ability to prosecute crimes.136 To safeguard
against the types of abuse apparent in Mr. Deaver's case, the testing
analyst must be subject to confrontation before allowing the admission
of test results into evidence either directly or through a testifying expert.
Even if the United States Supreme Court holds that the expert testimony
in Bullcoming was admissible under the Sixth Amendment, North
Carolina should provide additional constitutional protection by
affirming the dispositions in Brennan and Brewington.23 7

235. See BuIlcoming v. New Mexico, 226 P.3d 1, 6 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted, No. 0910876, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5754 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010); Brennan, 692 S.E.2d at 429-30; see
also Brewington, 693 S.E.2d at 186.
236. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
237. See Brennan, 692 S.E.2d at 431; see also Brewington, 693 S.E.2d at 190.
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